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Abstract 
This paper will look at how the explosion of  militant religious activism and 
violence against minorities in post-Suharto Indonesia is embedded in the state’s 
failure to apply a proper management of  religious diversity and civic pluralism. 
In the bottom of  this issue lies controvertial Law No. 1 of  1965 on the 
prevention of  the abuse or insulting of  a religion,  known as the Blasphemy 
Law. Debates have abounded on the extent to which the Law has transgressed 
the principles of  religious freedom guaranteed by the Indonesian Constitution. 
This paper will thus also examine petitions filed by human rights activists 
and civil society organizations to demand judicial reviews of  the Law before 
the Constitutional Court 
[Artikel ini akan menjelaskan bagaimana militansi aktifis agama dan 
kekerasan terhadap minoritas pasca Soeharto yang muncul akibat kegagalan 
Negara dalam mengelola keragaman agama dan pluralitas masyarakat. Dasar 
dari persoalan ini berpangkal pada kontroversi UU No. 1 Tahun 1965 
tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama atau yang 
dikenal dengan UU Pencemaran Agama. Perdebatan yang panjang telah 
1 This paper was presented at the International Workshop on The Growing 
Religious Intolerance in Indonesia, organized jointly by Rajaratnam School of  
International Studies (RSIS), Singapore and Pascasarjana UIN Sunan Kalijaga, in 
Yogyakarta on 24-25 September 2015. I would like to thank RSIS for providing research 
funding for this paper. 
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mengarah pada pelanggaran prinsip hukum mengenai jaminan kebebasan 
agama oleh konstitusi. Artikel ini juga akan membahas petisi yang diajukan 
oleh aktifis HAM dan ornop untuk mengajukan judicial reviews ke 
Mahkamah Konstitusi.]  
Keywords: Blasphemy, Ahmadiyya, religious freedom, judicial reviews 
A. Introduction
Indonesia has evolved to be one of  the most democratic Muslim 
countries in the world. The story began with the demise of  Suharto’s New 
Order authoritarian regime in 1998 that heralded a freedom of  expression. 
Despite its success in undertaking the whole process of  democratic 
transition, Indonesia by no means has encountered no challenge in 
transforming its political landscape. The biggest challenge was related 
to the rise of  militant Islamist groups that engulfed the political arena 
of  Indonesia by calling for jihad and other violent actions. Interestingly, 
although these groups have lost their momentum to take control over 
the Indonesian public sphere along with the on-going democratic 
consolidation and global war on terror, violent discourses and actions 
continue resonating. Demonstrations organised by conservative Muslim 
groups erupted against minority religious groups. They threatened to close 
and burn down a dozen churches deemed illegal and suspected to be 
the headquarters where hidden Christianisation projects are taking place. 
Conflicts occurred not only between religious groups, but also within 
religious groups. Key examples of  conflict occurring within religious 
groups include attacks on Ahmadiyya and Shiite communities in several 
Indonesian provinces.    
The growing tide of  religious conflicts and violence against 
minorities after Suharto seems inseparable from the failure of  Reformasi to 
touch upon the fundamental issue of  reforming the state’s management 
of  religious diversity that requires democracy as a precondition for it 
to develop. Without a significant touch on this issue, the position of  
religion vis-a-vis democracy has remained problematic for religion is at 
the intersection of  a struggle between state, society and political forces. 
Individuals, groups and political forces thereby compete to represent 
the right to define boundaries in support of  their organized claims 
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and delegitimize those of  others. The matter takes more urgency as 
democracy necessitates sustained responsibility of  individuals, groups and 
the state to promote fundamental values, notions, and principles which 
are essential for democracy. As Almond and Verba2 have put it, there is 
a strong correlation between successful democratization of  a country 
and democratic culture and structure of  polity. From this point of  view, 
democratic culture is an amalgamation of  freedom and participation 
on the one hand, and norms and attitudes on the other. It is rooted in 
a civic culture that features high levels of  social trust, civicness, mutual 
cooperation and responsibility. 
This paper will look at how the explosion of  militant religious 
activism and violence against minorities in post-Suharto Indonesia is 
embedded in the state’s failure to apply a proper management of  religious 
diversity and civic pluralism. In the bottom of  this issue lies controvertial 
Law No. 1 of  1965 on the prevention of  the abuse or insulting of  a 
religion,  known as the Blasphemy Law. Debates have abounded on the 
extent to which the Law has transgressed the principles of  religious 
freedom guaranteed by the Indonesian Constitution. This paper will 
thus also examine petitions filed by human rights activists and civil 
society organizations to demand judicial reviews of  the Law before the 
Constitutional Court. 
B. Religion and State in Indonesia
Indonesia is home to the largest Muslim population in the world. 
According to the population census of  2010, 87.18% per cent of  237.6 
million of  Indonesians are Muslims, 6.96 per cent are Protestants, 
2.9 per cent are Catholics, 1.69 per cent are Hindus, 0.72 per cent are 
Buddhists, and 0.38 per cent are others. Despite the freedom guaranteed 
by the Indonesian Constitution (article 29), “for every citizen to practice 
his respective religion and belief,” interestingly religious tensions and 
conflicts have been rife throughout the modern Indonesian history. The 
tensions and conflicts were rooted in the political dynamics of  Indonesia 
in the run-up toward her independence in 1945. As a result of  the 
opposition of  Sukarno-led secular nationalists and like-minded leaders 
2 Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes 
and Democracy in Five Nations (London: SAGE Publications. Inc, 1989), pp. 340–5.
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who preferred a secular republican model based on the Pancasila and 
the Constitution of  1945, the struggle of  Islamist leaders in the Majelis 
Syura Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Consultative Assembly, 
Masyumi) to implement what was later known as the Jakarta Charter 
ended in failure. In the Jakarta Charter there is a stipulation that requires 
Muslims to conform to the shari`a, a requirement that would place the 
state unequivocally behind Islam. This stipulation was removed from 
the Pancasila, whose first principle simply contains the words “Believe 
in One God [Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa].” This failure has been perceived 
by some Muslims a betrayal of  the state toward their rights as a majority. 
Accordingly, the issue of  the Jakarta Charter has constituted a recurrent 
theme in the Indonesian politics.3 Given such a historical trajectory and 
the fact that its population is tremendously large, with a great diversity of  
religion, ethnicity, culture and tradition, Indonesia indisputably needs a 
proper strategy to manage religious diversity in order for it to guarantee 
inter-cultural tolerance and peaceful coexistence among different religious 
groups. The New Order realized this situation and thus endeavoured to 
manage the diversity, yet through a mechanism that often manipulated 
the diversity itself. Suharto inherited from his predecessor the presidential 
decree No. 1 of  1965 on the prevention of  the abuse or insulting of  a 
religion. This decree, which was made into a law by Law No. 5/1969, is 
notorious for its incompatibility with principles of  religious freedom as 
guaranteed by the Indonesian Constitution and human rights. Despite 
the very existence of  various forms of  religious beliefs in Indonesian 
society, it recognized only five religions: Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism.    
Along with the spirit of  this Law, shortly after his ascendancy 
to power in response to the failed communist coup in September 
1965, Suharto began to limit spaces for religious freedom and people’s 
participation in politics. He rejected the quest for revitalization of  
Muslim politics, for instance, but at the same time advanced a policy of  
3 Harry Jindrich. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun; Indonesian Islam Under the 
Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945. (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958); Benedict 
R. O’G. Anderson, Some Aspects of  Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation: 1944-
1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961); B.J. Boland, The Struggle of  Islam in 
Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982).
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marginalizing political Islam.4 To shore up his policy, Suharto popularized 
development jargon and imposed the Pancasila as the state’s governing 
doctrine. Any aspirations that challenged the Pancasila could be easily 
labelled either “left extreme” or “right extreme”; the Anti-Subversive 
Act inherited from Sukarno was used by the state to justify its methods. 
Through the indoctrination program called the Pedoman Penghayatan 
dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guide to Comprehension and Practice of  the 
Pancasila, P4), among other instruments, the Pancasila was systematically 
embedded in the minds of  Indonesia’s citizens. 
 To strengthen its hegemony over society and remove remnants of  
the Indonesian Communist Party, Suharto’s New Order intensified the 
application of  the Law No.1 of  1965 by supervising Aliran Kepercayaan 
(Javanese Mystical Sects). Positioned at the front guardian for this 
matter, the Attorney General’s Office subsequently formed the Team 
PAKEM (Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, or the Supervision 
of  Aliran Kepercayaan in Society). This team was charged with a task 
to watch various forms of  belief  in society considered closely related 
to the Indonesian Communist Party. During the period from 1971 to 
1983 the Team PAKEM banned six Aliran Kepercayaan dan also sects 
of  official religions, including Aliran Darul Hadist (Islam Jamaah), Aliran 
Kepercayaan Manunggal, Agama Budha Jawi Wisnu, Aliran Sanyoto, 
Saksi Jehova and Inkarussunnah.5  
The New Order established official religious bodies and institutions 
representing the recognized religions, including Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(MUI, the Indonesian Council of  Ulama) for Islam, Persekutuan Gereja-
Gereja di Indonesia (PGI, the Communion of  Churches in Indonesia) 
for Protestanism, Bishop’s Conference of  Indonesia (KWI, Konferensi 
Waligereja Indonesia) for Catholicism, Perwakilan Umat Buddha 
Indonesia (Walubi, the Indonesian Buddhist Council Association) for 
Buddhism, and Hindudharma for Hinduism.These institutions are 
granted the authority to control the forms of  religious activities and 
4 Martin van Bruinessen, “Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of  State-Islam 
Relations in Indonesia”, in Indonesien am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. by Ingrid Wessel 
(Hamburg: Abera-Verlag, 1996), pp. 19–34.
5 Manatar Raja Mada Silalahi, “Protecting the One and Only God: A Human 
Rights Assessment on Indonesian Blasphemy Law”, Master’s Thesis (Oslo: University 
of  Oslo, 2010), pp. 22–3.
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interpretations in society and define whether there is any deviation from 
the fundamental religious teachings of  the religions.6   
The establishment of  these semi-governmental bodies of  the 
recognized religions was also aimed at domesticating the social and 
political forces of  religious communities. To the Indonesian Council 
of  ‘Ulama’, for instance, the function of  issuing religious legal opinions 
(fatwas) and religious advises (tausiyahs) would be assigned. The nature of  
the Indonesian Council of  Ulama as a body whose creation was instigated 
by the government was soon visible. The idea for the establishment of  
this council was made known to public during a national conference of  
Muslim preachers held in 1970 by the Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia 
(Centre for Indonesian Islamic Propagation). Mukti Ali, a modernist 
Muslim scholar appointed as a minister of  religious affairs in 1971, 
recalled the idea and facilitated another conference of  Muslim preachers 
in 1974. Suharto came to deliver opening address to this conference, in 
which he insisted the need for a nationwide body of  ‘ulama’ that can serve 
as, among other functions, the translator of  the concepts and activities 
of  development as well as the mediator between the government and 
‘ulama’.7 The Indonesian Council of  Ulama was officially established a 
year later and Hamka was elected as its first chairman. Shortly after its 
establishment, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia was involved in polemics 
and issued a number of  (controversial) fatwas legitimizing government 
policies.8 
At the end of  the 1980s, Suharto began to recognize the emotive 
and familiar message of  Islam. While suppressing any Kepercayaan and sects 
considered deviant from the fundamental teachings of  the recognized 
religions, he introduced a policy of  accommodating Islam by focusing 
particularly on the accentuation of  Islamic symbols in public discourse. 
6 Ibid., p. 24.
7 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of  Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
(1975–1998)”, Journal of  Islamic Studies, vol. 15, no. 2 (2004), pp. 147–79; Moch. Nur 
Ichwan, “‘Ulamā’, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia After Suharto”, Islamic 
Law and Society, vol. 12, no. 1 (2005), pp. 45–72; Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: 
Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order (ISIM-Leiden: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2006).
8 M. Atho Mudzhar, Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi tentang 
Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia, 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993).
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Islam was thus systematically incorporated in the frame of  reference of  
the state to offset the increasingly plausible challenge to the legitimacy of  
Suharto’s political leadership.9 In this context, the Directorate General 
of  Elementary and Secondary Education, for instance, issued a new 
regulation on student uniforms, lifting the ban for female students to 
wear headscarves (jilbab) while attending school. Suharto himself  and his 
family went to Mecca to perform the hajj pilgrimage in 1991. Since then 
cabinet members and high ranking officials have no longer hesitated to 
declare the Islamic greeting, Assalamu‘alaikum, in the opening passage of  
their speeches and this greeting is becoming increasingly popular. They 
also sought to demonstrate their concern with various Islamic affairs by, 
for instance, participating in religious festivals and celebrations. 
In this sense, the strategy of  the regime appeared to succeed in 
“subduing” pro-Islamist groups and indeed created “regimist Muslims,” 
who did not recoil from showing themselves as a real partner of  the state.10 
This incorporatist inclusion of  Muslim interests had in turn contributed 
to a re-politicisation of  Islam and the diversifying demands and challenges 
of  society difficult for the state to contain, channel, neutralise, or co-opt 
effectively.11 In his comparative study on Pakistan and Malaysia Nasr12 
refers to such a strategy as “Islamic leviathan,” which allowed regimes 
in power to avoid fundamental reforms in their economies, political 
structures, and policy making. He argues that as a facet of  the state’s 
drive to expand its power and control through manipulation of  ideology, 
the leviathan strategy hardly bears any positive result. In fact, the New 
Order’s Islamisation trend was showing signs of  decay when a wave of  
Reformasi forced Suharto to step down in May 1998. 
9 R. William Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation”, 
The Journal of  Asian Studies, vol. 55, no. 3 (1996), pp. 613–34.
10 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle 
for the Indonesian Middle Class”, Indonesia, vol. 56 (1993), pp. 1–35; Robert W. Hefner, 
Civil Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
11 Donald J. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (London: Routledge, 
2002).
12 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of  State Power 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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C. Managing Religion in Transition
In the atmosphere of  Reformasi brought about by Suharto’s 
departure shari‘a appeared to be a significant issue providing the medium 
through which collective actors associated with different movements 
within a cycle assign their aspirations and interests. This issue has 
facilitated the attempts made by the parties to propose the introduction 
of  the shari‘a into the Constitution, thus giving the shari‘a a constitutional 
status. Two Islamic parties, United Development Party (PPP) and Moon 
and Crescent Party (PBB), were at the forefront to revive debates on seven 
words “dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat bagi pemeluknya,” which had 
been removed from the Preamble to the Indonesian Constitution only 
a day after Independence, as indicated earlier. Later, the debates shifted 
from the idea of  Islam becoming the foundation of  the state (Dasar 
Negara) to the amendment of  Article 29 of  the Constitution.13Although 
these attempts ended in failure, the demands for the application of  the 
shari‘a have resonated across the country and to some extent materialized 
with the enactment of  shari‘a by-laws (perda). The introduction of  regional 
autonomy packages and direct elections of  regional administrators 
(pilkada) gave a remarkable boost to the attempts made by the shari’a 
supporters to appropriate religious laws for the interest of  their own, 
at the expense of  individual freedoms and the rights of  women and 
religious minorities.14
The mounting demand for the application of  the shari‘a by-laws 
constitutes an inevitable consequence of  inappropriate management of  
religious diversity by the state. As we have seen, the interest of  the state 
to maintain its legitimacy by politicising religious symbols has made 
religion function more as a means of  social control. Religion plays no 
role in fostering social cohesion, which Putnam15 explains as a term that 
encompasses “issues of  social justice, tolerance, inclusion and social 
13 Nadirsyah Hosen, “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent 
Debate”, Journal of  Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 36, no. 3 (2005), pp. 419–40.
14 Noorhaidi Hasan, Islamic Militancy, Sharia, and Democratic Consolidation in Post-
Suharto Indonesia, Working Paper, no. 143 (Singapore: Rajaratnam School of  International 
Studies, 2007).
15 Robert Putnam, “Education, Diversity, Social Cohesion and ‘Social Capital’”, 
presented at the OECD Education Ministers on Raising the Quality of  Education for All. 
(Dublin, 2004), p. 2.
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integration.” Coupled with the weakening of  state power, failure to instil 
these values would take a risk of  an increase in distrust and conflict in 
the society.16 
The absence of  trust that tied up different social groups also 
facilitated the eruption of  riots and communal conflicts divided along 
religious, racial, and ethnic lines. Reflecting a common outcome of  
economic and socio-political instability, ethnic and religious conflicts that 
flared up in various regions of  Indonesia threatened a society apparently 
imbued with a culture of  tolerance based on harmonious inter-ethnic and 
inter-faith relations. In the Moluccas a fight between two youths quickly 
devolved into the bloody communal violence between Christians and 
Muslims, which claimed thousands of  lives and wounded many others. 
Likewise, in Central Sulawesi, West and Central Kalimantan, protracted 
bloody communal confrontations which involved different ethnic groups 
resulted in property destruction and the mass exodus of  refugees.17
In line with the democratic consolidation taking place in Indonesia, 
these conflicts have gradually come to an end. The problem has not been 
dissolved yet, however. Animosity against minorities have increased as 
a result of  the identity politics proliferating in post-Suharto Indonesian 
public sphere. Opposition against minority groups such as Ahmadiyya 
and Shi’ite from the majority Muslim community erupted in various 
Indonesian provinces. Many of  them were expelled by mobs attacking 
their houses and places of  worship. Attacks also occurred against Christian 
communities. In January 2012, for example, members of  the Indonesian 
Muslim Communication Forum and the Islamic Reform Movement 
harassed Taman Yasmin Church members who were conducting a service 
at a member’s house. In another instance, in March the same year, the 
Batak Protestant Church Taman Sari Church in Bekasi was demolished 
16 Gary D. Bouma, “The Challenge of  Religious Revitalization and Religious 
Diversity  to Social Cohesion in Secular Societies”, in Religious Diversity and Civil Society, 
ed. by Bryan S. Turner (London: Bardwell Press, 2008), pp. 13–25; Amyn B. Sajoo, 
“Citizenship and Its Discontents: Public Religion, Civic Identities”, in Religious Diversity 
and Civil Society, ed. by Bryan S. Turner (London: Bardwell Press, 2008), pp. 27–47.
17 Charles A. Coppel (ed.), Violent Conflict in Indonesia; Analysis, Representation, 
Resolution (London: Routledge, 2005); Gerry van Klinken, Communal V iolence and 
Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars (London: Routledge, 2007).
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following opposition from the Taman Sari Islamic People’s Forum.18 
D. The Law No. 1 of  1965 on Blasphemy
Discussions have abounded on the issue of  whether the Law No. 1 
of  1965 plays a role in the state’s failure in protecting religious minorities. 
This Law is deemed responsible for the growing attacks against religious 
minorities targeted by hard-line Muslims on the basis of  an accusation 
that their religious belief  and practice amount to blasphemy or defamation 
of  a religion, which is prohibited by the Law. Ahmadiyya doctrine that 
believes in the central position of  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet 
after Muhammad charged with a special task to reform and re-interpret 
Muhammad’s messages through his holy Tadzkira is believed to have not 
only deviated from the fundamental teachings of  Islam but also insulted 
the Muslim majority recognized belief. Likewise, Shiites are considered no 
less dangerous than Ahmadiyya for their doctrine on imamate is believed 
to be in sharp contrast with that of  Sunni majority.  
Article 1 of  the Law No. 1 of  1965 prohibits “[e]very individual 
in public from intentionally conveying, endorsing or attempting to gain 
public support in the interpretation of  a certain religion embraced by 
the people of  Indonesia or undertaking religious based activities that 
resemble the religious activities of  the religion in question, where such 
interpretation and activities are in deviation of  the basic teachings of  the 
religion”. The Law also creates a new provision, Article 156 (a) of  the 
Criminal Code which imposes a five year prison sentence  for whosoever 
in public intentionally express their views or engage in actions: a. that in 
principle incite hostilities and considered as abuse or defamation of  a 
religion embraced in Indonesia. This article is to be read in conjunction 
with the provisions of  Article 1 of  the Law as mentioned above.
Hard-line Muslims and conservative organizations used the  Law 
not only to intimidate Muslim minorities such as Ahmadiyya and Shi’ite 
communities but also to criminalize them. This is quite problematic in 
a situation when Indonesia is consolidating its newly born democracy 
that necessitates respect for pluralism and multiculturalism. Despite 
18 Jennifer Yang Hui, “Religious Harmony Under Attack in Indonesia”, The 
Nation, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/opinion/30216068, accessed 5 Sep 
2017.
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mounting criticism against the state policies towards religious sects and 
minorities, the government remained ambivalent to the principle of  
religious diversity. In response to the Ahmadiyah case, for instance, in 
2008, the Minister of  Religious Affairs, Attorney General and Minister 
for Internal Affairs issued a Joint Decree that cautioned members of  
the Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) against committing the offences 
indicated in Article 1 of  the Law. In addition, it “warn[s] and instruct[s] 
the followers, members and/or leaders of  the (JAI), provided that 
they profess to being believers of  Islam, to cease the propagation of  
interpretations and activities in deviation of  the teachings of  Islam, that 
involves the propagation of  an ideology that believes in the presence 
of  a prophet along with his teachings after the Prophet Muhammad” 
(Article 3). Furthermore, it seeks “to warn and instruct members of  
the community to maintain and safeguard harmony among believers of  
different religions as well as unity in public order within a community 
by not engaging in violation of  the law against the followers, members 
and/or leaders of  the (JAI)” (Article 4). Failure to comply with these 
provisions would result in sanctions according to the Criminal Code, 
especially Article 156a which is the complement to the Law.
E. The First Judicial Review
Understanding the situation, human right activists and civil society 
organizations expressed their concern with the Law No. 1 of  1965 as 
one of  the factors behind continued religious intolerance in the country. 
They filed a demand for constitutional review of  the Law before the 
Constitutional Court. No less than 54 legal counsels unified in “the 
Advocating Team of  Religious Freedom” represented the petitioners to 
argue that the Law is in conflict with the Indonesian Constitution in terms 
of  both formal and material aspects. The Law was issued in the era of  
guided democracy as a result of  Presidential Decree of  1959 which gave 
an unlimited power to Sukarno. Hence, unlawful from the perspective 
of  the constitutional law. They insisted that the Law has transgressed 
the principle of  religious freedom as stipulated in article 28E (1 and 2), 
article 28I (1), and article 29 (2) of  the Indonesian Constitution.19 They 
19 Silalahi, “Protecting the One and Only God”; Melissa Crouch, “The 
Indonesian Blasphemy Case: Affirming the Legality of  the Blasphemy Law”, Oxford 
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believed that the Constitution is very clear in guaranteeing the rights of  
every citizen to practice his/her own religion and faith. In other words, 
religious freedom is  a non-derogable right guaranteed by the Constitution 
and thus, no one, even the state, has the right to decrease or diminish it. 
Moreover, the petitioners were of  the opinion that the definition 
of  the act of  blasphemy in Article 1 of  the Law No. 1 of  1965 is quite 
loose: Whether someone or a group of  people, such as Ahmadis or 
Shi’ites, who express their own theological belief, which is certainly 
different from that of  the Muslim Sunni majority, can be considered 
to have committed blasphemy. The same holds true for its elucidations 
which limit the number of  the official religions into five and now six, 
after Confucianism was recognized as an official religion, and this can 
serve as a pretext to degrade the freedom of  religion guaranteed by 
the Constitution. In the words of  the petitioners, Article 1 of  the Law 
justifies the state’s ambivalence toward religious diversity and even its 
discriminative attitude toward certain religious communities. Apart from 
that, the petitioners were also of  the opinion that the regulation granting 
the Minister of  Religious Affairs, Attorney General, and Minister of  
Internal Affairs the authority to involve in the process of  prohibiting an 
allegedly blasphemous organization or sect transgresses the principle of  
due process of  law that requires any forms of  dissolution and prohibition 
be carried out through a fair, independent, and open trial. 
In 2010, the Constitutional Court decided the case by affirming 
the legality of  the Law No. 1 of  1965. According to the Court, the legal 
norms of  the Law are not in conflict with the Constitution for they 
are aimed at protecting existing religious communities, especially the 
freedom of  the mainstream religious communities to believe and practice 
their respective religions. In  other words, the Law is deemed necessary 
for Indonesia to protect religions from any insulting actions. Thus, the 
Constitutional Court believed that, despite any weaknesses, the existence 
of  the Law has been instrumental to protect people against anyone or a 
group who deliberately disturb and even harm their religious belief. The 
Constitutional Court claimed that problems sometimes occur indeed, but 
Journal of  Law and Religion, vol. 1, no. 2 (2012), pp. 1–5; Nurhasanah, “Penolakan 
Mahkamah Konstitusi Terhadap Judicial Review atas Undang-Undang Nomor 1 PNPS 
Tahun 1965 Tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan Penodaan Agama Perspektif  
Fiqh Siyasah”, BA Thesis (Yogyakarta: UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2014).
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at a practical level, when, for instance, judges interpreted the articles in 
the Law with their narrow understanding and perspectives.20
F. The Second Judicial Review
Discontented with the above result, in 2012 a group of  lawyers 
united in Universalia Legal Aid Institute, supported by Indonesian 
Association of  Ahl al-Bayt, filed a demand to the Constitutional Court 
for the second judicial review on the Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 on behalf  
of  those claiming to be victims of  the Law. This petition was pleaded 
in response to brutal attacks by Sunni Madurese majority against Shiite 
community, followers o f  Tajul Muluk, in Sampang Madura. The attacks 
caused a dosen casualties and displaced hundreds of  Shiites from their 
home town.21 The Indonesian Council of  Ulama of  East Java issued a 
fatwa legitimizing the attacks by stating that Shi’ite teachings, i.e., those 
of  the Twelver Shi’ism (Imamiyah Ithna Ash’ariyah) or those using the 
pseudonym like Madzhab Ahl al-Bayt and the other similar ones, as well as 
the teachings similar with the basic doctrines of  the Twelver Shi’ism, are 
misguided and misleading. More dramatically, Tajul Muluk was brought 
to trial. Presecutors charged him of  having committed a criminal offense 
as stipulated in Article 156a on the basis of  various reasons, including: 
He added the standard shahada to acknowledge the very existence of  
twelve imams among the followers of  Ithna Ash’ariyya and Ja’fariyya; 
He excommunicated some Companions, father-in-laws  and wives of  the 
Prophet Muhammad.
He forced his followers to commit taqiyya (hidding their belief) before 
the Sunni majority.
20 Crouch, “The Indonesian Blasphemy Case”; Ratno Lukito, “In-Between the 
Two Pressures: Constitutional Notorious of  the Indonesian Blasphemy Law”, presented 
at the Heresy, Blasphemy and Apostasy from a Legal Point of  View (Göttingen: Faculty of  
Humanities Georg-August-Universität Göttingen - Faculty of  Sharia and Law UIN 
Sunan Kalijaga, 3 Jun 2014).
21 The process of  this Judicial Review, where I was involved as one of  expert 
witnesses, is recorded in draft book. See Yayasan LBH Universalia, Permohonan 
Pengujian Pasal 156A KUHP Juncto Pasal 4 UU Nomor 1/PNPS/1965 tentang Pencegahan 
Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama Kepada MK RI Perkara Nomor 85/PUUX/2012 
(Jakarta: Yayasan LBH Universalia, 2014).
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  The petitioners argued that despite the fact that the Constitutional 
Court’s decision in  2010 entirely rejected the petition pleaded in the 
first judicial review, the Law remains in need to be reviewed as the 
Constitutional Court’s judges themselves clarified that Article 156a of  
the Criminal Code used to criminalize the victims should be interpreted 
carefully and appropriately by police, prosecutors and judges. This 
clarification indicates the judges’ inconvenience of  the Law. One is 
puzzled indeed on the extent to which the law enforcement apparatus 
could appropriately interprete the article. Without a clear guideline 
to interprete the article,  the petitioners argued, the issue remains 
constitutionally problematic. Even, the use of  Article 156a might be 
inconsistent with the spirit of  the  Law and, thus, potential to disturb 
constitutional right of  a citizen. In their opinion, Tajul Muluk is a clear 
example of  how a citizen should lose his freedom—being detained 
for four years—because of  the article. They insisted that there is an 
inclination among law enforcement apparatus to refer to the fatwa of  
Indonesian Council of  Ulama, which have constitutionally no authority 
to judge whether a religious group or belief  is deviant from Islam. On 
behalf  of  Tajul Muluk and his followers, they therefore demanded an 
abolishment of  Article 156a and the Law as well. 
Article 3 of  the Law No. 1 of  1965 actually sought to limit the 
application of  Article 156a. It is stated that this article is only applied 
for those ignoring warning by the government authorities in the form of  
a joint decision to be issued by Minister of  Religious Affairs, Attorney 
General and Minister of  the Internal Affairs: Those stopping their 
artivities after being warned by the authorities cannot be prosecuted. 
The petitioners argued that the necessity for the government authorities 
to warn ‘any deviant sect’ by issuing a joint decree is a condition for the 
application of  Article 156a and this is justified by various  jurisprudences, 
including the verdict of  the District Court of  Polewali on 28 June 2006. In 
the case of  Tajul Muluk and his followers, they have never received such a 
warning from the government authorities, but directly to confront phisical 
attacks by the Sunni majority and persecution by the legal apparatus. In 
the petitioners’ opinion, the application of  Article 156a on Tajul Muluk 
and his followers clearly violates the citizents’ freedom to profess religion 
and to worship according to  their respective beliefs.
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The petitioners also questioned the Constitutional Court’s 
understanding that the right and authority to determine true teachings 
of  a religion belong to the parties within the religion. According to 
the Court, every religion has its principal teachings generally accepted 
by followers of  the religion. Moreover, as a country that adopts the 
principle of  inseparability between religion and the state, Indonesia has 
the Ministry of  Religious Affairs charged not only with a special duty to 
serve and protect the growth and development of  religions, but also has 
the apparatus and organization to collect opinions of  religious authorities 
within a certain religion. Therefore, the state does not autonomously 
determine the principal teachings of  a religion, but through its capacity 
to collect opinions so as to reach an agreement of  the parties within the 
religion in question.
 Acoording to the petitioners, by allowing the Ministry of  Religious 
Affairs to collect opinions of  religious authorities of  a certain religion 
in order for them to determine correct fundamental doctrines of  the 
religion the state denies citizens’ right to believe and practice their own 
religion and belief. Given a diversity of  religious groups and opinions 
within a certain religion, the Ministry of  Religious Affairs was inclined to 
simplify the matter by relying on official religious bodies and institutions 
representing the existing religions. Hence, the Indonesian Council of  
Ulama’s dominant position in defining what true and not true about 
Islam, for instance. 
An expert witness in the case, I myself  questioned the Indonesian 
Council of  Ulama’s authority through its fatwa to judge whether a religious 
belief  or sect (religious organization) is heretical and theologically 
misleading so that its followers must return to true teachings of  the 
religion. The Court’s decision in Madura to punish Tajul Muluk and his 
followers clearly referred to the fatwa of  the Indonesian Council of  Ulama 
in East Java stating that Shi’ite teachings propogated by Tajul Muluk are 
heretical and misleading. I argued that fatwa is a non-binding legal opinion 
from the perspective of  Islamic law and hence, contingent to certain 
contexts, mostly political. Ulama themselves have differing opinions 
on every legal issue as their techniques of  drawing legal inferences vary 
along with their madhhab preferences. Indeed, Islam does not prevent 
Muslims from having different opinions not only on legal issues but also 
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on theological issues pertaining to its fundamental belief  and teaching. 
The significance of  political context for a fatwa is evidenced in the fatwa 
on Shiite in 1984 by the Indonesian Council of  Ulama, which were then 
forced to emphasize harmony among different religious groups along 
with the government policy of  making Pancasila as the sole fondation 
(asas tunggal) of  all political, social, cultural and even religious activities.
This fatwa only stated that there is a need for Indonesian Muslims to be 
aware of  destructive (meaning political) influences of  Shiites on religious 
harmony in the country.     
Moreover, I argued that in Islamic tradition theological debates have 
abounded since the early days of  Islam. After the death of  the Prophet 
Muhammad, the debates have become more intense along with Muslims’ 
encounter with Greek philosophical tradition. Touching on fundamental 
doctrines of  Islam, including the issues of  God, prophethood of  
Muhammad, the authenticity of  the Quran, destiny, and Judgment Day, 
the debates took place within the specific domain of  mutakallimun, or 
theologians.  Ideas and opinions arising from the debates were called ra’y 
or theological opinions and these were beyond the authority of  muftis 
whose domain was confined to respond to legal issues by using legal 
categories such as obligatory, recommended, permitted, disapproved and 
forbidden. The theological opinion, on the contrary, examined a thought, 
deed or action of  a person from a theological perspective: Whether that is 
false and misleading, for example. Those having theological opinions will 
bear on their shoulder theological consequences, not legal consequences. 
And the theologians always asserted that this is ra’y or theological opinion, 
which has accordingly nothing to do with legal affairs. In a theological 
conception, one having the authority to lay down consequences to such 
actions is not ruler or theologians, but God alone. If  the person is declared 
infidel from a certain theological point of  view, he would be prepared to 
accept theological consequences, being punished by God. 
G. Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that recent tensions and conflicts occuring 
within certain religious group and among different religious groups in 
Indonesia have inextricably linked to the dynamics of  political transition 
in the aftermath of  the demise of  Suharto’s New Order authoritarian 
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regime in 1998. The failure of  Reformasi to touch on the management of  
religious diversity has positioned religion in a complicated situation via-a-
vis democracy. In fact, despite the declining threats of  Islamic radicalism 
and terrorism, Indonesia has not been away from possible explotion of  
religious conflicts. Demonstrations against minority religious groups 
organized by conservative and hard-line Muslim groups have repeatedly 
erupted. The most dramatic occured when a group of  people in Cikeusik 
Banten attacked Ahmadi community and burned down their houses. 
Similar tragedy occurred when a group of  Sunni Madurese majority 
attached Shiite community, the followers of  Tajul Muluk, in Sampang 
and displaced them from their home town. Perpetrators of  violence even 
succeeded in cancelling the visit to Indonesia by singer Lady Gaga and 
the speaking tour by Irshad Manji, the Canadian lesbian Muslim author 
and activist. 
Recently a wave of  protests and rallies erupted in Jakarta and other 
big cities of  Indonesia against the alleged defamation of  Holy Qur’an 
by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), the incumbent Chinese Christian 
governor of  Jakarta running for the second term.  The rallies attracted 
millions of  Muslims from a large spectrum of  the Indonesian society 
to participate in support of  the Indonesian Ulama Council’s Fatwa on 
Ahok saying that Muslims should not be misled by the use of  the Quranic 
verse Al Maidah 51 when electing their leader. Under the banner of  
the National Movement of  the Guardians of  the (GNPF MUI), they 
demanded Ahok’s trial and even imprisonment.  
At the center of  such cases lie the controvertial Law No. 1 of  
1965 that to some extents has granted a legitimacy for hard-line and 
conservative Muslims to intimidate religious minorities on the basis of  an 
accusation that their religious belief  and practice amount to blasphemy 
or defamation of  a religion, which is prohibited by the Law. Human 
right activists and civil society organizations made attempts to demand 
judicial reviews on the Law. The petitioners highlighted importance of  
religous freedom as guaranteed by the Indonesian Constitution. The Law 
itself  has its own historical background and was issued within certain 
political context related to mounting threats of  Communism leading to 
the failed Communists coup in 1965. Suharto’s New Order regime sought 
to appropriate the Law for its own interests especially to maintain its 
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hegemony and power. Despite the rejection by the Constitutional Court 
of  the judicial reviews, the attempts made by the human right activists 
and civil society organizations remain crucial to remind the Indonesian 
government of  the importance of  a proper management of  religious 
diversity, which is in line with the spirit of  religious freedom guaranteed 
by Islam. 
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